UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

IN THE MATTER OF:)))	Bankruptcy No. 08-12229 Chapter 11
WASHINGTON MUTUAL, INC., et al,)))	Wilmington, DE October 30, 2008
Debtors.)	2:03 p.m.

TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE MARY F. WALRATH UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

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(The following was heard in open court at 2:03 p.m.)

THE COURT: Good morning -- excuse me -- good afternoon.

MR. JANG: Good afternoon, Your Honor. On behalf of the debtors, Chun Jang of Richards, Layton, Finger. With me today is -- from Weil, Gotshal and Manges, Brian Rosen, and he'll be handling the bulk of the matters today.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Could the parties who are on the phone please mute their phones. All right. I think that's done.

MR. ROSEN: We'll do our best. Good afternoon,
Your Honor. Brian Rosen, Weil, Gotshal and Manges on behalf
of WMI and WMI Investment.

We have several items on this afternoon's calendar, and what I'd like to do, Your Honor, is go through them, and to the extent that there is no objection, and based upon the Court's preference, we would then either hand up and order if the Court so approves them, or hold those until the end, whatever the Court would prefer.

THE COURT: You can either hold them till the end or hand them up now, and I'll have them either way. Are there some with black line changes?

MR. ROSEN: Your Honor, based upon the discussion with Mr. McMahon, we'll do it as we go along here.

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THE COURT: All right. That's fine.

MR. ROSEN: Thank you. Your Honor, the first item on the agenda was the debtors' motion for approval of interim compensation and reimbursement of expenses for professionals in the case. We have not received any objections to that. We had spoken with the U.S. Trustee with respect to that motion, and I believe that the U.S. Trustee is -- has okayed the entry of that particular order.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ROSEN: Your Honor, the second -- I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Now that we have two microphones, you can share the podium if you'd like.

MR. McMAHON: Your Honor, good afternoon. Joseph McMahon for the acting U.S. Trustee.

In the form of order as filed, there was that auto apply provision to subsequently file cases, and the debtors have agreed to remove that.

MR. ROSEN: I apologize, Your Honor. Yes, that change was made and then it was -- we have a black line for that one, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ROSEN: The second item on the calendar, Your Honor, is the debtors' motion to establish a date for the filing of schedules and a statement of financial affairs. We have spoken about this issue with the United States

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Trustee. We have explained to the United States Trustee and we actually explained it today at the 341 meeting that we had, the issues associated with getting information and compiling the schedules and the statements of financial affairs.

Based upon that, Your Honor, as the Court will recall, we had asked for an extension through the end of the year. We had a discussion with the United States Trustee, and the debtors believe that they can accomplish that, providing, of course, that we get all of the access that we hope to get from JPMorgan Chase which has these materials by December 15th. I do understand, however, that the United States still has an issue with respect to this and may request it to be an earlier date.

MR. McMAHON: Your Honor, good afternoon again.

Joseph McMahon for the acting U.S. Trustee.

While we recognize that the debtors are in a bit of an unusual posture with respect to obtaining records, my understanding is that the debtors are obtaining the records on a continuing basis with respect to preparing the schedules and statements. And from our perspective, while we talk about these extended time frames in the context of big cases where there are lots of assets to be inventoried and the like, we're talking about the holding company and a subsidiary with -- my understanding is not much to do with

it.

In light of the fact that we are dealing with the holding company and another entity, just two debtors, we think that the more prudent approach at this point, instead of going to I think December 29th was -- or the end of the year as was requested in the motion, and I don't know if the debtors have modified that request formally, we would request that the date be set in December -- an early date in December, December 1st or some time around there where we could revisit this issue if the circumstance warranted it.

And to complete the record on this point, Your Honor, we did hold an initial meeting of creditors today. That meeting is being held and continued to an open date pending the filing of those documents.

MR. ROSEN: Your Honor, the statement that it is merely a holding company, while it is, in fact, a holding company, it is a lot more than that. And as the United States Trustee is aware and as all the parties who attended the 341 meeting today are aware, the information that was used by the holding company and the bank's subsidiary was all integrated on one computerized system.

And while we do have access from time to time, the access to that is really at the graces of the people who are in control of that computerized system at this point in time. So while requests are made, we don't know the

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timeliness of the response to it nor the breadth of the response that we are going to get.

As a result, Your Honor, we understand Mr.

McMahon's position, but we do believe that 45 days from what is conceivably this week to the middle of December, it would be an appropriate time frame. We hope very much that it will be accomplished in that time, and if not, of course, we would come back to the Court for appropriate relief. But by -- we don't want to come back, Your Honor, because we believe firmly that December 1st is not going to be sufficient time, and we don't want to waste the assets of the estate in filing a motion at this point in time that we know we will have to ask for more relief.

THE COURT: Well, I'm reluctant to give such a long extension without revisiting it. I'm going to give to December 1. We'll continue the hearing and continue the pending request, to have it till the end of December. But I'd like more information before December 1 on where we are on this.

MR. ROSEN: That's fine, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And whether partial schedules can be filed, I don't know if that's possible, with amendments later.

MR. ROSEN: Well, we can certainly do that, Your Honor, to the extent that the information is available.

Would the Court, in making that ruling, ma'am, would you 1 2 believe that we would have to file another application if, 3 in fact, December 1 wouldn't work or present that in a status conference? 4 5 THE COURT: Just present in a status conference. I'll continue the pending motion. I think the pending 6 7 motion asks till December 29. 8 MR. ROSEN: Yes. 9 THE COURT: So we'll continue that. 10 MR. ROSEN: Thank you. 11 THE COURT: I don't know when your omnibus is, towards the end of November? 12 13 MR. ROSEN: It's actually November 14th, so it's a little bit early in the process, but perhaps we could get --14 15 oh, 25th, okay. We have another one on the 25th, so --16 THE COURT: All right. 17 MR. ROSEN: -- we could revisit it at that point in time. 18 19 THE COURT: All right. 20 MR. ROSEN: Your Honor, based upon that, we'll make revisions to that proposed order. 21 22 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. MR. ROSEN: The next application that is on is for 23 24 the retention of Richards, Layton, Finger, and I will hand

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the podium over.

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MR. JANG: Good afternoon again, Your Honor.

Again for the record, Chun Jang of Richards, Layton, Finger.

With regard to our retention application, Your Honor, the United States Trustee made a few informal comments and to accommodate the U.S. Trustee's request, we had filed a supplement affidavit of Mark Collins and made a couple of revisions to the order so if you wouldn't mind, I'd hand up the blackline --

THE COURT: You may. Thank you.

MR. JANG: The major change to the order relates to whether or not the retainer received by Richards, Layton & Finger would be considered an evergreen retainer, and we had agreed that it would be just a general security retainer.

THE COURT: Okay. And the supplemental affidavit satisfied the U.S. Trustee on the issue regarding representation of the clients?

MR. McMAHON: Your Honor, it does.

THE COURT: Okay. I'll enter the order as revised

MR. JANG: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. ROSEN: Your Honor, the next item on the agenda is the debtors' application to retain Kurtzman Carson Consultants, LLC, as claims and noticing agent to the debtors and to appoint them as agent to the Bankruptcy

1 Court.

We received slight comments to that application from the United States Trustee. Revisions have been made to the order to incorporate those changes, and it is my understanding that with those changes, there are no objections to the application.

May I approach, Your Honor?

THE COURT: You may. Thank you. All right. The changes look fine to me. I'll enter that order.

MR. ROSEN: Your Honor, the next item on the agenda is the debtors' motions for the employment of Alvarez and Marsal pursuant to Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code and designating Mr. Kosturos as the chief restructuring officer nunc pro tunc to October 2nd, 2008.

There have been some communication between us and the United States Trustee with respect to this application, and I hope, but I cannot promise that all of those issues have been resolved. So I think I have to let Mr. McMahon speak at this time.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McMAHON: Your Honor, good afternoon. Joseph McMahon for the acting United States Trustee. I did speak with Mr. Kosturos from Alvarez who's present in the courtroom today. We had a final tie-up issue with respect to time records and another detail point on the order.

What I would suggest is that we -- we clean the order up and submit that under certification of counsel after the hearing. Mr. Kosturos is okay with the changes that we propose.

THE COURT: All right. Then I'll look for that under certification of counsel.

MR. ROSEN: Thank you.

Your Honor, the next -- I'm sorry.

MR. HODARA: Your Honor, good afternoon. Fred Hodara of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer and Feld for the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors.

The Creditors Committee also engaged in conversations with Weil Gotshal with respect to the Alvarez engagement, and I just want to confirm on the record, and I'll ask Mr. Rosen to confirm two things: One, that the fees of Alvarez and Marsal will be subject to a traditional reasonableness standard. And the second item that the Creditors Committee will be provided with detailed monthly statements over the course of the engagement.

MR. ROSEN: Your Honor, I apologize for not making that representation. Yes, we did agree to all of that. We have, in fact, made those changes to an order which we will now further modify and we will include that so that everybody can see it.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ROSEN: But that is correct.

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MR. HODARA: Thank you.

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MR. ROSEN: Your Honor, the next item on the agenda is the application to retain Weil, Gotshal and Manges as attorneys for the debtors.

In this regard, Your Honor, we have not received any objections, although we have engaged in conversation with the United States Trustee on certain issues. As a result of those conversations, we submitted a supplemental affidavit yesterday which addressed hopefully the concerns of the United States Trustee. But then I found out there was still one outstanding item, and so I am going to represent on the record and hopefully clarify the issue for the United States Trustee.

Specifically, Your Honor, the United States Trustee has asked with respect to what was contained in the initial Rosen affidavit a comment with respect to JPMorgan Chase. And based upon that, Your Honor, I can represent on the record that Weil, Gotshal and Manges is able to commence litigation against JPMorgan Chase including a turnover action for moneys which may be held by JPMorgan Chase. only thing that we are not permitted to do, Your Honor, is bring a lender liability action against JPMorgan Chase or an avoidance action. But even in those circumstances, that may be done on consent of JPMorgan Chase.

As we indicated in the initial Rosen affidavit, if, in fact, either a lender liability action or an avoidance action would have to be commenced, we would utilize conflicts counsel in those instances.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you have a copy of the supplemental affidavit? It was not provided to me.

MR. ROSEN: I am sorry. I could hand one up right now.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Any further comments, Mr. McMahon?

MR. McMAHON: Well, Your Honor, very briefly.

Joseph McMahon for the acting U.S. Trustee, a couple points here.

First, the supplemental affidavit which Mr. Rosen filed addresses an issue in one paragraph relating to a supplemental search that Weil, Gotshal is going to be conducting. In the initial affidavit, we discovered that the horizon for the connection search which Weil, Gotshal and Manges conducted was two years prior to the bankruptcy filing.

And we had some discussion regarding whether -- I guess, what appropriate disclosure would be in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding. Weil, Gotshal has voluntarily agreed to supplement that disclosure with, I guess, a more extensive search which -- the results of which are going to

be filed with this Court. And ultimately our rights with respect to that supplemental disclosure will be reserved as well as to take, you know, I guess, whatever action we would deem appropriate in light of the disclosure.

With respect to, Your Honor, the -- the JPMorgan Chase issue, counsel has made the statement on the record. We have requested a copy of the -- of the actual waiver letter. We'll continue those discussions with counsel, and our rights are likewise reserved on that point. But I did want to identify that issue specifically for the Court.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ROSEN: Your Honor, with respect to supplemental inquiries, specifically, Mr. McMahon has asked us to go beyond the horizon under the theory that there would be an extended statute of limitations that might be applicable here, and, therefore, there might be a conflict that -- that could be created. Obviously, the greatest statute of limitations that we're aware of are six years, and those are obviously for certain situations like fraudulent transfers, none of which we think would be applicable in this circumstance.

But, nevertheless, Your Honor, we will do a supplemental search as requested by Mr. McMahon, as we always do with every representation of a debtor, we will file supplemental affidavits to the extent that there is

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something worthy of further disclosure, subject to Mr. McMahon's rights with respect to that subsequent disclosure.

THE COURT: All right. With respect to the JPMorgan Chase issue, however, is there currently -- I don't know if Richards, Layton is able to be conflicts counsel in that event. What --

MR. ROSEN: Well, Your Honor, with respect to lender liability issues, we certainly don't see anything at this point in time since they just came to the party by way of the FDIC receivership and the acquisition, so there's nothing that would predate other than one day this Chapter 11 case. Although there may be another relationship out there that we will ultimately determine, but we don't see it at this point in time.

Likewise, Your Honor, to the extent that they have assets that belong to the debtors and we are able -- or we are required to seek a turnover of those, we are committed to do so. It is not as if there is an avoidance action. Again, as there was no long-term relationship, we don't see the need for the avoidance action at this time. But I know that doesn't answer your question as to whether or not there is conflicts counsel available, and I don't think counsel is able to answer that right now either.

MR. JANG: That's correct, Your Honor.

MR. HODARA: May I?

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THE COURT: Yes.

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MR. HODARA: Just very briefly on that one

From the Creditors Committee perspective, it would

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question of the JPMorgan relationship.

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seem, as Mr. Rosen indicated, that the only likelihood in

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the near term -- likelihood may not be the right word -- the

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only prospect in the near term for litigation with JPMorgan

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would be on turnover rather than the bad acts, lender

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liability, fraudulent transfer type matters, and the

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turnover could pertain not just to the cash account of which

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everybody is aware but to documents which is in some ways a

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more immediate and pressing issue, particularly in light of

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what the United States Trustee has had to say today on that

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THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. McMAHON: Very briefly again, Your Honor, in light of our discussions with counsel, I think we were, I

subject with respect to schedules and other matters.

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guess, agreeable to proceed with the reservation of rights

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under Section 328(c) or otherwise in the event that the --

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the issue does come up with respect to counsel that's being

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employed.

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application with the caveat that to the extent there is any

THE COURT: Well, I would be willing to grant the

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information that debtors' counsel becomes aware of regarding

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any possible claims against JPMorgan, that they advise the U.S. Trustee and the Creditors Committee.

MR. ROSEN: Certainly, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Then in that event, I can leave it to the Committee and the U.S. Trustee to take the appropriate action, if necessary.

MR. ROSEN: Fine.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ROSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. And we'll -- we will revise the Weil, Gotshal order consistent with some of the discussions that we've had today, and then present the Court with a certification.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ROSEN: Thank you.

Your Honor, the next item on the Court's calendar is the debtors' motion for entry of an order for interim and final orders establishing notification procedures and approving restrictions on certain transfers of interests in the debtors and scheduling a final hearing for that.

Your Honor, we have received a few responses with respect to the relief that is requested there, I don't think any of which create any issues for the -- for the debtors and for the Court, specifically, they are more reservation of rights and certainly in some instances, with respect to reservation of rights to a final hearing. But, Your Honor,

I can go through those.

I also have in the courtroom today, Your Honor, Mr. James Carreon. Mr. Carreon is with Alvarez and Marsal and he is a managing director and he is primarily involved in the tax aspects of this Chapter 11 case. And I can at some point, Your Honor, if the Court desires, proffer his testimony or we can save that for the final hearing if the Court desires.

Your Honor, the responses that we have received are several. One was a reservation of rights of Fir Tree Value Master Fund and Fir Tree Capital Opportunity Master Fund, LP, and, Your Honor, that merely was a reservation to establish -- excuse me -- Fir Tree reserves its right to object or respond merely to the -- at the final hearing.

JPMorgan sought confirmation that it would have no effect, that the relief being requested would have no effect on the NOL, carry-forwards or other tax attributes, and a reservation with respect to whose property the NOLs and the attributes really belong -- or where they rest.

Your Honor, we did, in fact, include a footnote in the proposed orders that the debtors did not intend the relief in the motion to affect the rights, titles and interests, if any, of WMB or WMBfsb which are the bank and its subsidiary, the fsb. So, Your Honor, we believe that that issue has already been taken care of.

The FDIC has also filed a pleading, and it does not object, once again, to the procedures or the restrictions that we set forth in the motion. They objected, however, to the blanket assertion that the NOLs are property of the debtors' estates. And once again, Your Honor, I don't believe that is an issue for today or even at a final hearing with respect to that. That is again, Your Honor, something that we are happy to reserve all rights to because what we are trying to do pursuant to the relief requested is merely preserve those NOLs and those attributes for whoever is entitled to receive those.

The IRS also sent an email saying that they do not object to the motion and that they will be taking the position that the NOLs are not property of the estate, once again, Your Honor, not something that we have to deal with today.

Lastly, Your Honor, we also were in communication with a group of lenders that is -- excuse me -- by White and Case and Mr. Lauria who has asked us to include in the proposed order that they receive notice with respect to a sale as we set forth in the procedures. Specifically, Your Honor, in addition to the debtors and the Committee, that Mr. Lauria's group and Mr. Lauria specifically as counsel for that group, receive the notice. And we are prepared to make that agreement as well, Your Honor.

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And I would also represent on the record that in the event that there are notices that are filed by a party wishing to buy or wishing to sell, that we would also, besides giving that notice to the parties, we would also consult with them so that they would give us their perspective whether or not the debtors, in response to those notices being filed, should take a position pro or con, whether they should allow that transaction to go through.

With that, Your Honor, I think I have disposed of each of the responses or the reservations that have been filed. I don't know if there are any more out there, if someone wants to stand up in court, but I believe that those are all the pieces of paper that we have received with respect to the relief requested.

THE COURT: All right. Any other party wish to be heard?

MR. LAURIA: Your Honor, if I may, just to clarify, comments of counsel were correct, I think I just wanted to make sure that there are a variety of different notices that they may get including dispositions, et cetera, and we're to be included in all of those.

> THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ROSEN: Yes, Your Honor, we are happy to do so, and we will -- it was our thought, Your Honor, that if the Court grants relief, we'll revise the order and again

present it to the Court subsequently.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LANDIS: For the record, Adam Landis from Landis, Rath and Cobb here on behalf of JPMorgan Chase.

We are satisfied with Mr. Rosen's representation on the record. We did file a response for the limited purpose of making sure that any tax attributes or NOLs that were not properly allocable to the debtors were not being affected by the motion. That is the case. The footnote is the footnote in the order, and we're satisfied, so thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McMAHON: Your Honor, Joseph McMahon for the acting U.S. Trustee, and we basically have two very brief comments on the motion.

The first is the findings with respect to any acquisition or action taken in violation of the procedures being action null and void, ab initio, in violation of the automatic stay. While we appreciate the fact that the debtors have their position with respect to that issue, we question whether it's a -- it's appropriate to have language to that effect even in an interim order where the counter party who is to be affected by the procedures who is not before the Court is not here to, I guess, present its view or its position with respect to that point.

With respect to the procedures themselves, Your Honor, the last paragraph, numbered seven of paragraph 13 of the motion, indicates that the debtors, in consultation with the Committee, can effectively waive in writing the restrictions, stays and notification procedures contained in the motion.

And I don't know if other parties in interest have considered this, but in light of some of the responses that have been received, we wonder whether it's appropriate for that subject to be the sole and exclusive province of this Court on notice rather than kind of like being done on a more limited basis.

MR. ROSEN: Your Honor, with respect to the first item, it's -- the reason we filed the motion and the reason we sought expedited consideration of it, was because of the fear that there might be subsequent trading as soon as that motion was filed, and the results of that fading -- that trading -- excuse me -- would actually cause a loss of attributes to the debtors' estates before the entry of an interim order.

It is -- that is why we included a specific relief that was set forth in the motion and the fact that we noticed it as broadly as we could as soon as we did file that motion. I understand Mr. McMahon's concerns, but if, in fact, there is that now gap that could be out there, we

have the problem of the potential loss of attributes which would certainly harm the interests of all parties to the estate.

With respect to the paragraph seven, I actually believe, Your Honor, that that would be counter. The parties here are concerned not with respect to us waiving anything, but they're concerned rather with respect to the preservation of their rights to the extent that they may exist in the NOLs or the attributes. I believe we're going to be doing that with respect to Mr. Lauria's clients on notice or in consultation with them on that point, and so I don't understand Mr. McMahon's point.

THE COURT: I guess his point is that, should you be consulting with the FDIC and JPMorgan Chase before allowing someone to -- to sell.

MR. McMAHON: That's precisely our point, Your Honor.

MR. ROSEN: Well, Your Honor, I'm --

THE COURT: Or don't -- or don't permit the debtor to waive the restriction.

MR. ROSEN: -- I'd rather go that route.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ROSEN: We won't waive it, because I don't want to be in a position of us going out there and -- and canvassing. So that's fine, Your Honor. We'll take that

provision out

Your Honor, based upon that, and I don't know if

Your Honor, based upon that, and I don't know if the Court would like me to go through a proffer --

THE COURT: I would like to hear a proffer.

MR. ROSEN: Okay. Your Honor, as I indicated, I have in the courtroom with me here today Mr. James Carreon. He is a managing director of Alvarez and Marsal Taxand, LLC, which is an affiliate of Alvarez and Marsal, North America, LLC. And as the Court is aware, based upon the application that was just approved by the Court, Alvarez is going to be serving as the restructuring adviser to Washington Mutual, Inc., and its affiliated debtor, WMI Investment Corp.

If called to testify, Mr. Carreon would testify that he holds Bachelor's Degrees in business administration and communications from the University of Southern California, a law degree from Southwestern University School of Law and an LL.M. from Golden Gate University of Law.

He would also testify that he is an adjunct professor at Golden Gate University and the co-author of the BNA portfolio on related party transactions.

He would testify that prior to joining A&M,
Alvarez and Marsal, he worked with FTI Consulting where he
provided transaction tax services.

He worked at Sheppard, Mullin, Richter and Hampton, LLP, where he provided legal advice with respect to

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Proffered Testimony of James Carreon general tax matters, including mergers and acquisitions; Ernst and Young's National Office West where he served as the technical resource for the West Coast E&Y offices, advising on merger and acquisition transactions; and was a member of the Camp 382 sub practice dedicated to tax attribute projects where he performed over 100 tax attribute studies for various clients; and also at Deloitte and Touche where he provided general corporate tax advice with an emphasis on structured transactions.

Mr. Carreon would testify that A&M's involvement with the debtors commenced on October 2nd. He would testify that on October 10th of 2008, A&M filed its application to be retained, and as the Court is aware, we have worked with the retention here today.

He would state that since joining A&M, he has personally overseen the day-to-day operations of the debtors' tax department in light of the displacement of that department in connection with the receivership and the subsequent sale of Washington Mutual Bank to JPMorgan Chase.

Mr. Carreon would testify that to date the debtors estimate that WaMu has net operating loss carried forward amounts and/or built-in or unrecognized losses in excess of \$20 billion in addition to certain other tax attributes. would testify that the tax attributes may be valuable assets because Title 26 of the United States Code, the tax code,

generally permits corporations to carry over their losses and tax credits to offset income.

He would further state that the NOLs can be

Proffered Testimony of James Carreon

He would further state that the NOLs can be generally carried back two years and carried forward 20 years. He would testify that the debtors may recognize gain or other income in connection with, among other things, the ownership of its assets and the sale of a significant portion, if not substantially all, of their assets during the pendency of these bankruptcy cases.

Mr. Carreon would state that absent any intervening limitations, the tax attributes could substantially reduce the debtor's future Federal, State and local income tax liability with respect to such amounts. He would state that the debtors also expect to carry back a significant portion of their NOLs and built-in unrecognized losses in an attempt to obtain a refund of prior year taxes. He would state that any reduction in the debtors' tax liability would enhance the debtors' cash position for the benefit of all parties in interest.

Mr. Carreon would further state that the ability of the debtors to use the attributes to offset future taxable income and in certain cases prior years' income is subject to certain statutory limitations. He would say that Sections 382 and 383 of the tax code limit a corporation's use of its NOLs, tax credits and other tax attributes to

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Proffered Testimony of James Carreon offset future taxable income to the extent that the corporation has experienced an ownership change, and in the case of certain losses, unrecognized, following an ownership change may preclude the carry-back of such losses.

Mr. Carreon would testify that for purposes of Section 382 of the tax code, an ownership change generally occurs when the aggregate percentage of a company's equity held by one or more persons or entities holding five percent or more of that company's stock and certain groups of less than five percent shareholders increases by more than 50 percentage points above the lowest percentage of ownership owned by such shareholders at any time during the relevant three-year testing period.

He would state that the proposed restrictions on trading in the motion are crucial because once an interest is acquired, the acquisition might not be reversible for tax purposes absent such restrictions.

Mr. Carreon would testify that once a transfer acts to limit the debtors' ability to use the tax attributes under Sections 382 or 383, such ability may be permanently lost. He would state that the relief requested is therefore necessary to prevent an irrevocable loss of the debtors' use of the tax attributes.

Mr. Carreon would testify that the debtors are uncertain as to whether a 382 exchange has already occurred

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Proffered Testimony of James Carreon with respect to the tax attributes. He would state that whether or not an exchange has already occurred prior to the date today, there could remain available a multi-billion dollar net operating loss that would be adversely affected and could be eliminated by a subsequent ownership change thereby resulting in a potential loss of value to the estates.

In fact, Mr. Carreon would state that an ownership change even as late as October 30th could deprive the debtors of the use of at least an estimated \$2 billion in NOLs because of the method in which such tax attributes are prorated under the tax code.

Mr. Carreon would testify that the proposed restrictions and notice procedures are necessary to preserve the debtors' potential ability to use the attributes which may be valuable to the estates. He would state that the debtors' ability to meet the requirements of the tax laws to preserve the attributes would be seriously jeopardized unless the procedures and restrictions are established immediately to ensure that trading and WMI stock is either curtailed or closely monitored.

He would testify that some trading in the stock may not pose a serious risk to the tax attributes unless the debtors generally seek to impose only an advance notice and objection procedure and limit the relief sought to

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Proffered Testimony of James Carreon transactions implicating a holder of WMI stock that is or seeks to become or cease to be a "substantial equity holder" as we defined in the motion.

Mr. Carreon would state that the relief requested is narrowly tailored to permit certain stock trading to continue subject to applicable securities, corporate and other laws. He would seek that the debtors are seeking only to enforce the provisions of the automatic stay in connection with certain types of stock trading that pose a serious risk under the ownership change test and to monitor other types of trading that potentially pose a serious risk.

He would state -- he would state that it is in the best interest of the debtors and their stakeholders to restrict stock trading that could result in an ownership change under Section 382 of the code during the pendency of these Chapter 11 cases.

He would state that the required substantial ownership notice, equity transaction notice and equity disposition notice coupled with the equity objection deadline will enable the debtors to best monitor trading of the WMI stock and ensure that no ownership change is occurred pursuant to the tax code.

Finally, Mr. Carreon would state that if the debtors filed the NOL motion in accordance with the usual notice procedures set forth by the Bankruptcy Rules and the Proffered Testimony of James Carreon

Local Rules of this Court, it was possible that a flurry of equity trading would immediately follow as parties holding the stock would rush to transfer or may rush to transfer such stock and lock in any losses related thereto, or others may rush to acquire stock before any prohibition on trading is approved by the Court.

Mr. Carreon would testify that this possibility necessitates the interim relief requested by the debtors and the proposed nunc pro tunc relief to account for any applicable trading of the stock after the filing of the motion but before entry of either the interim or final orders.

That would be his testimony today, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Does anybody wish to cross-examine Mr. Carreon? All right. I'll accept the proffered testimony.

MR. ROSEN: Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor, with that, we would submit that we have established sufficient cause to approve the interim relief as requested and ask the Court to enter the order that -- with the changes that we are going to make based upon the conversations that we have had, we will submit to the Court subsequently.

MR. McMAHON: Your Honor, very briefly, we address the point with respect to the debtors' ability to waive

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Proffered Testimony of James Carreon certain requirements. We have raised, I quess, two points, and the first point -- the ones I'm coming back to, whether, I guess, findings are in the order with respect to the applicability of the automatic stay. I would just ask the Court for clarification on that point.

THE COURT: All right. Well, let me state first, based on the testimony presented by the debtor, I'm satisfied that the debtor has met the requirement that there be a finding of immediate and irreparable harm if the relief is not granted.

I do find the findings set forth in the proposed form of order to be appropriate. I think it is necessary to make that finding in order to grant their relief nunc pro tunc to the filing of the motion, and I can do so based on the testimony. I think it's essential that the trading not affect the value of the NOL to the extent it's property of the estate.

So I will grant the order subject to the modifications you stated you'll make.

MR. ROSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. We will make those.

Your Honor, the last item on the calendar this morning is actually a motion of Siemens -- Siemens IT Solutions and Services, Inc., and counsel is here for that.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MINUTI: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 1 2 THE COURT: Good afternoon. 3 MR. MINUTI: Mark Minuti from Saul Ewing. I'm here today for Siemens IT Solutions and Services, Inc. I 4 5 rise only to introduce the Court to my outside counsel, Doug Lipke from the Vedder Price firm. He will handle the 6 7 hearing today. Your Honor has already entered an order admitting him pro hac vice. 8 9 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 10 MR. MINUTI: Thank you, Your Honor. MR. LIPKE: Thank you, Mr. Minuti. Good 11 afternoon, Your Honor. 12 13 THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. LIPKE: Douglas Lipke on behalf of Siemens IT 14 15 Solutions. Your Honor, we come before Your Honor in an 16 17 unusual contract, executory contract with a holding company 18 that the sole purpose is to provide services to a bank 19 that's been taken over by the FDIC and sold to JPMorgan. 20 Neither the bank, WaMu Bank, or JPMorgan having privity with Siemens, with the subject contract. 21 22 The subject agreement provides -- for Siemens to provide IT support services to all 50,000 WaMu Bank, now 23 24 JPMorgan end users at 2,500 locations and branches of the

bank around the country, and to provide those services, they

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have 300 -- Siemens has retained and has 350 dedicated employees that spend 100 percent of their time on the contract.

JPMorgan, I'm pleased to report to the Court, that JPMorgan personnel and Siemens' personnel and the WaMu personnel that are still on board have been meeting diligently over the last 30 days to try to come up with a resolution as to how to continue these services or to have a transition of the services going forward but yet no commitment.

This agreement is a five-year agreement whose term expires on October 7th, the first week of October of 2009. So it still has approximately another 11 -- 11 to 12 months left on the contract.

Siemens was then backed into a corner here without much of an option as to what to do during this limbo period, not having received the \$10 million but being forced to provide the services on a daily basis, come out of pocket on a daily basis and provide the services to a party that's not privy to the contract who has committed verbally to continue to pay going forward but not to provide any of the payment of the \$10 million that was owed prepetition.

Those payments by the way, Your Honor, prior to the filing of the Chapter 11, were paid on a regular basis, on a monthly basis, pursuant to the contract where Siemens

would provide an invoice, and within a few days, then the payment would be made. Two of those payments got caught up -- they're approximately \$5 million a month -- two of those payments got caught up with the bad timing. One was ready to come right before the filing.

The agreement -- and this is an important part, an important fact, I think, for Your Honor to know, is that this agreement provides for a 30-day notice of an early termination. So if it was assumed, if the debtor wasn't in a Chapter 11, the debtor would be able to provide a 30-day notice at which time there would be a four-month wind-down period to which Siemens would be given a four-month wind-down period and paid wind-down fees to give them the opportunity to transition out the 350 employees that produce on a daily basis under the contract and to recover some of the costs, the out of pocket costs that are set forth in the reply that they've incurred and that they will lose.

Yet here, they're in a situation where there's no termination date, the parties aren't able to tell them how long their services will be needed. On any seven-day notice of a motion to reject which Your Honor is likely to -- in typical circumstances and situations -- approve, the contract would be rejected and -- and JPMorgan would be able to take over and we'd be left with the 350 employees and all the other out of pocket expenses without being paid.

The debtor in those circumstances would be left with a big unsecured rejection damages claim. JPMorgan would be free of the contract because it's not privy to it, and it could transition all these services into their own IT services, and Siemens would be left with a significant unsecured claim for damages and 350 employees with nowhere to go.

Another important fact, Your Honor, is that we have third-party vendors that help support these agreements. In the event that, on short day notice, the agreement would be rejected, Siemens would be prejudiced by having early termination clauses under those contracts. We're not even sure, Your Honor, if the confidentiality provisions and the proprietary information provisions set forth in this agreement would even apply to JPMorgan, the purchaser of the bank, because they're not a party to the agreement.

It's clear that what JPMorgan would like, and it's actually set forth in the debtors' objection at paragraph five, that what they would like is to maintain status quo, offer to pay the post-petition five million a month until they indicate that it is no longer -- that they no longer wish to avail themselves of the contractual liabilities.

So at any particular time when they feel that they're ready to take over, they can push a button, ask the debtor to file a motion to reject within seven days, Siemens

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would be left naked at that point, again at which time the debtor would receive rejection damages. Siemens is left with the 350 employees.

The case law that's been cited by both the debtor and Siemens suggests that this Court should balance the burdens in this unusual circumstance where a party files a motion to ask for an early rejection or assumption date, and here it appears that all the burdens are borne by Siemens and all the burdens are borne by the debtor. Based on information and belief, we don't believe the debtor gets any economic benefit from allowing JPMorgan to use the services of this particular contract.

I have with me today, Your Honor, the -- an individual by the name of Joseph Fabrizio who is the vice president of service delivery on large enterprise accounts, prepared to testify as to the prejudice resulting from a short seven-day notice of rejection. He is the party -- he is the vice president in charge of this particular account, and he's also in charge -- excuse me -- of 12 other similar accounts. So he's very familiar with the issues, the problems, the services and --

THE COURT: Well, are we going to hear testimony or do you want to proffer his testimony?

MR. LIPKE: It's your choice, Your Honor. I'm willing to put him on the stand. I'm also willing to

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proffer. THE COURT: Well, let's go by proffer unless

counsel for the debtor has any objection.

MR. ROSEN: No, Your Honor. I'm happy to hear the proffer and cross-examine if necessary.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. LIPKE: Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor, with me today is, again, Mr. Joseph Fabrizio who is the vice president of service delivery on large enterprise accounts for Siemens IT Solutions and Services.

If called to testify, Mr. Fabrizio would testify that he's been with Siemens for ten years and four years he's been the vice president in the position that he's in today providing the oversight on 12 contracts similar to the one we're involved with JPMorgan and the debtor today.

Mr. Fabrizio would testify that he's very familiar with the subject agreement, a copy of which I have with me today, Your Honor. We did not file along with the motion because it's voluminous with multiple schedules and provides very sensitive and confidential pricing information, but we have copies to submit to Your Honor today and to counsel for the debtor and the Committee, if for some reason, it's deemed necessary.

Mr. Fabrizio would testify that in the event that

Proffered Testimony of Joseph Fabrizio a rejection order would be entered within short notice and without the transition period that the -- that Siemens would

time dedicated employees, dedicated to this contract alone

be prejudiced as follows: First, there's 350 Siemens' full-

in three different countries. In the event that there would be a short term termination, inability to redeploy these

employees, the cost to Siemens of severance would be \$2.4

million.

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Mr. Fabrizio would testify that he holds weekly conference calls with the 350 WaMu dedicated employees in order to keep them on board. They are very concerned, he would testify, based on discussions with them, of losing their jobs before the holiday. He's lost up to ten to 12 -he would testify that he has lost up to ten to 12 of the employees that have worked on -- of the 350 -- that have gone on and found other jobs elsewhere, and in order to maintain the service required under the contract, he's had to hurry around and try to find other employees to replace these employees who were providing 100 percent of their time to the services of this contract.

He would testify that the JPMorgan WaMu site for the current WaMu employees provides that they will be notified by December 1 that -- whether or not they will be retained by JPMorgan going forward. He would testify that he cannot give his employees a similar notice because he has

Proffered Testimony of Joseph Fabrizio no idea when this contract will end, when it will be rejected, how far and how long it will go forward.

He will further testify that if he had a transition period as required under the agreement, he would be able, over a period of time, to redeploy these employees and that the current agreement provides for -- for a fourmonth wind-down period in order to do so.

He would testify that, in addition to having the 350 Siemens' employees on the job, that they were required to purchase network equipment and software, laptops, computers, desktops for the 350 employees and that the contract provides for the depreciation and amortization of that over the period of the contract through October of 2009, and that \$1.9 million of that cost is still on the books.

He would testify that in addition to the network equipment and software, that Siemens was required to purchase \$690,000 -- or at this time, the balance of \$690,000 of specific parts, inventory and parts to service the WaMu, now JPMorgan equipment for repairs on this IT support system, and that in the event of a short notice of a rejection, they would have no choice for this specific equipment to sell it to some liquidator at -- at a very minor cost.

He would testify that at the beginning of this

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Proffered Testimony of Joseph Fabrizio contract that they advanced \$4 million to Washington Mutual to pay a termination fee to the previous IT third-party contract that -- that was taken over by Siemens and that \$770,000 of that cost still remains to be amortized over the rest of the contract, that in the event that Siemens was terminated on an early termination here, not only would it not recover that cost but it wouldn't recover any of the other early termination fees that are provided for in the subject contract.

He would further provide that, as a part of this contract, that Siemens was provided -- was required to put \$126,000 -- actually, in excess of that, into a Mason, Ohio facility which is a central network operations center, and that in the event of a short rejection period, they would not be able to transition out any of the investment in that facility and that the full remaining balance of 126,000 would be lost.

He would further testify that they have several third-party contracts including with IBM and Sun Microsystems that provide subcontracting support to provide the services now required by JPMorgan and formerly WaMu, that in the event of a short rejection motion and order entered by the Judge, that Siemens would be burdened with early termination fees on those particular contracts.

He would further testify that in -- over the last

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Proffered Testimony of Joseph Fabrizio 30 days, he and his colleagues of the Siemens IT group, have met with JPMorgan IT group personnel as well as the former WaMu personnel that are still there on a regular basis including over the last two weeks on a daily basis to provide how the services are provided and how they would be provided going forward.

And during those discussions he learned that -that the -- he has been told, and based on his experience with all the other 12 contracts, that it's his belief that JPMorgan should be in a position to decide whether or not it needs to reject or assume and assign the particular contract or direct the debtor to either assume or -- assume and assign or reject within ten days, although earlier, JPMorgan had advised them that they needed 90 days of due diligence to figure out what to do, 30 days of which has already occurred.

Your Honor, that concludes the proffer --

THE COURT: All right. Does any --

MR. LIPKE: -- other than, Your Honor, if -- if necessary, I do have the contract here, submit it as an exhibit, ask that it be admitted into evidence. It is not --

THE COURT: Well, if you don't want it -- do you want it redacted or sealed?

MR. LIPKE: Well, we've taken off -- I'm not sure

	Proffered Testimony of Joseph Fabrizio 45
1	that we need it except if if Your Honor needs it to make
2	the decision. If we do submit it, I've taken off the
3	exhibits that are the sensitive pricing. The form of the
4	contract that I have right here that has the form on wind-
5	down period, the 30-day termination and the like is
6	contained in here, and I've gotten permission from Siemens
7	to make this a matter of public record.
8	THE COURT: All right. Then you may hand it up.
9	We'll mark it as M-1.
10	MR. LIPKE: May I approach?
11	THE COURT: You may.
12	MR. LIPKE: Thank you.
13	THE COURT: You can give it to me.
14	MR. LIPKE: Thank you.
15	THE COURT: Thank you.
16	MR. ROSEN: Could we have a copy?
17	MR. LIPKE: Yes.
18	MR. ROSEN: Thanks.
19	MR. LIPKE: Your Honor, I would ask that it be
20	admitted.
21	THE COURT: All right. Any cross-examination of
22	the witness first?
23	MR. ROSEN: Your Honor, first I'd like to object
24	certainly to the last aspect of the proffer where counsel

said that, Mr. Fabrizio was told, and he then proceeds to go

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Proffered Testimony of Joseph Fabrizio 46 into a -- a launch of some hearsay evidence. And so I would ask that that be stricken from the proffer about the ten days versus 90 days and anything thereafter.

THE COURT: Why is that not hearsay?

MR. LIPKE: I think it's an admission, Your Honor. In any event, Your Honor, what he can testify to is that based on those discussions and his experience with these types of contracts over the last ten years and as vice president of all of these contracts, that it's his belief that it would take no more than ten days after the 30 days that they've had in order for them to make a decision as to whether or not to assume or reject.

THE COURT: Well, with that caveat, this is based on his experience, I'll -- I'll allow it --

MR. LIPKE: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- and overrule the objection. Do you want to cross-examine the witness, though?

MR. ROSEN: Your Honor, I think it would be appropriate, although in order not to burden the Court with some burdensome and duplicative cross-examination, I would like to get together with Mr. Landis for just a few moments, perhaps five minutes, Your Honor, and then cross-examine the witness at that time.

THE COURT: All right. Let's take a five-minute break then.

1	MR. ROSEN: Thank you, Your Honor.
2	(Recess taken, 3:01 p.m. to 3:08 p.m.)
3	THE COURT: All right. Let's have Mr. Fabrizio
4	sworn.
5	MR. LIPKE: If I may, Your Honor, he's there and I
6	wanted to ask him to take the stand. Thank you.
7	THE COURT: All right. Remain standing so you car
8	be sworn.
9	COURTROOM DEPUTY: Please raise your right hand.
10	JOSEPH FABRIZIO, SIEMENS' WITNESS, SWORN
11	COURTROOM DEPUTY: Please state and spell your
12	name for the record.
13	THE WITNESS: Joseph Fabrizio, F like Frank-A-B-R-
14	I-Z-I-O.
15	COURTROOM DEPUTY: Thank you. You may be seated.
16	THE COURT: Just for the record, can you confirm
17	that the proffer made by your counsel is what you would have
18	testified to on direct had you been called.
19	THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor, it was.
20	THE COURT: Okay. You may cross.
21	MR. LANDIS: Thank you, Your Honor. For the
22	record, Adam Landis from JPMorgan from Landis, Rath and
23	Cobb on behalf of JPMorgan Chase.
24	CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. LANDIS:

Q Mr. Fabrizio, I don't have very much, but I'm going to

ask you a couple of questions.

The IT support agreement to which you testified by proffer is a complex agreement, isn't it?

- A I would say so, yes.
- Q Okay. And it includes, does it not, services that are provided both to WMI, the debtors in this case, and WMB, the operating bank company that was sold to JPMorgan Chase?
- A Mr. Landis, we were never made aware of that. I have no idea on who provides what service. We provide services to all WaMu employees. Where their employment resides, I have no -- no knowledge of that.
- Q Well, that's not really what I asked you, sir.
- 14 A Sure.
 - Q What I asked you is that under the agreement, services are provided not only to WMI, who's the contract party, but also to WMB?
 - A Again, counselor, I have no recollection -- I have no knowledge of that. We provide services to everyone that contains a WaMu ID irregardless of, you know, what holding company or what bank they belong to.
 - Q Well, sir, I want to -- I want to back up a little bit.

 You're -- you're very familiar with the agreement, according to your proffered testimony, correct?
- 25 A That is correct.

- Q Okay. And you're aware, are you not, that there was a sale of operating assets to JPMorgan Chase?

 A That is correct.
 - Q Okay. And are you aware that JPMorgan Chase is receiving some of the benefits of the IT services agreement?
- A Yes, they are.

Q Okay. And are you aware that the holding company, WMI, also has information and employees that it would be receiving -- excuse me, let me strike that and rephrase it.

Are you also aware that -- that WMI has employees?

A Again, counselor, I have no knowledge of who's WMI and who's WaMu Bank. I only service everyone that has a WaMu -- WaMu UID.

- Q Okay. If there is a WMI employee who needs information, would that -- that WaMu -- that WMI employee would receive that information pursuant to the IT support services agreement, wouldn't he?
- 18 A Provided he has a WaMu UID.
 - Q Okay. So -- and the way the IT services agreement is structured, there is no differentiation, is there, between services provided to WMI or WMB, correct?
 - A Counselor, I'm not trying to be funny here, but if they have a WaMu ID, they're entitled to service delivery under this agreement, and we do not differentiate nor have they told us to differentiate.

Right. That's really what I was getting at. There is

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- no differentiation to -- to use your term. And there -- in
- terms of the billing, there's no differentiation between WMI
- A We -- you're correct. We only submit one invoice to WMI.
- Q Okay. And that one invoice to WMI is a general invoice, correct for all services provided?
- A That is correct.

and WMB, correct?

- Q Not broken out for WMB; not broken out for WMI, correct?
- A The only breakout would be that we -- we break out the services that are delivered to the WaMu Card Services Group.
- Q Okay. So under the agreement then -- let me -- let me strike that, too. Let me go back.
- You testified in your proffered examination about a number of different potential claims that Siemens would have were the contract rejected. Do you recall that testimony, sir?
- A Yes, I do.
- Q Okay. And if the contract were rejected today, those claims would be quantifiable, you'd be able to figure out what the number is on those claims, correct?
- A That is correct.
- Q And you would file a claim against WMI in connection with the rejection of the contract, correct?

A That would be one way, yes.

- Q Okay. Well, would there be another way?
- A Well, if we had more time, the claim would be reduced significantly. It would give us an opportunity to mitigate some of those claims.
- Q Well, in all events, though, you would have a claim against WMI if WMI were to reject the contract today? Now, without regard to mitigation and what your obligations are or your abilities are to mitigate, all I'm asking is, you would have a claim for the damages in connection with the rejection of that contract, correct?
- A That would be correct.
 - Q Okay. And if the contract ultimately were assumed by the debtor and assigned, any claim for prepetition amounts owing would have to be cured as either they're quantified or agreed to by the parties, correct?
 - A Again, that's correct, but the amount would be significantly different depending on the time frame we had to remediate it.
 - Q Well, again, I wasn't speaking to mitigation. I'm just
 -- I'm just suggesting and I want to get your understanding
 of it, that if the contract were to be assumed, those
 prepetition amounts would have to be cured?
- 24 A Correct.
- Q Okay. You are aware, are you not, of a stipulation

between the debtors and JPMorgan Chase with respect to the payment of certain post-petition amounts in connection with contracts that are in the name of WMI?

- A So -- just in -- could you rephrase that -- a little bit more English so?
- Q Well -- sorry about that. It got a little long. I believe in your proffered testimony there were statements with respect to your knowledge of an agreement that JPMorgan Chase would pay for, post-petition amounts, where it was a beneficiary of a contract?
- 11 A Correct, that is correct.
- Q Okay. So you're aware of an agreement whereby JPMorgan
 Chase would -- would pay for post-petition amounts?
 - A For services that are delivered.
- 15 Q To it?

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- 16 A Correct.
- Q Okay. And you've spoken with representatives of JPMorgan Chase, have you not?
- 19 A Yes, I have.
 - Q Okay. And you believe that JPMorgan Chase will pay post-petition amounts that are owing under the services agreement, of the IT services agreement as they come due, correct?
- A Again, we have not received any payment from them, but they're the claims that they have made.

- Q Well, you've seen a written agreement, haven't you?
- A Counselor, I have, but they've also put our payments on hold currently pending their review.
- Q Well, we can get to that.
- A Okay.

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Q But you've seen a written agreement whereby JPMorgan Chase has obligated to pay post-petition amounts to you?

MR. LIPKE: Objection, Your Honor. Foundation.

THE COURT: Overruled. Can you answer?

THE WITNESS: Would you repeat the question,

please.

- MR. LANDIS: Yes.
- 13 BY MR. LANDIS:
- Q You've seen a written agreement between JPMorgan Chase and the debtors, have you not?
- 16 A Yes, I have.
- Q Okay. And you understand -- you've read that written agreement, have you not?
- 19 A Yes, I have.
- Q Okay. And you understand that in that written
 agreement, JPMorgan Chase has obligated itself to pay postpetition amounts owing under the IT services agreement, do
 you not?
- 24 A Yes, I do.
- Q Okay. And you don't, as you sit there today, have any

- reason to believe JPMorgan Chase is not going to pay those amounts, do you?
 - A Other than the fact that they have put the invoices for post-petition work on hold pending their review of the contract.
 - Q Well, have any amounts been paid to Siemens?
 - A Not from JPMorgan Chase.
 - Q Siemens -- it's your testimony that Siemens has not received any payments from JPMorgan Chase on account of either prepetition or post-petition amounts owing under the IT services agreement?
 - A To be honest with you, I do not know prepetition where the payment came from. Post-petition, payments are due actually tomorrow, the end of the month for the first payment.
 - Q So as you sit there today then, no post-petition payment is due --
- 18 A Well --

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- 19 Q -- right now?
- A -- it's not due till tomorrow, but we have confirmation, okay, from the accounts payable department, that they're on hold.
- Q Okay. I really don't want to know about your confirmation --
- 25 A Okay.

- Q -- from -- from the AP department.
- A Yes.

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- Q But your testimony, just to be crystal clear, nothing is due today?
 - A Nothing is due today.
 - Q And to back up just a little bit, you have received some payments on account of prepetition claims -- amounts that are owning under the IT services agreement, correct?
 - A I can't really answer that because I don't know, sitting here today, what payments, the moneys we received, were applied to, whether they were post or prepetition.
- 12 Q Well, payments were made, correct?
- A Payments were made, but I'd be guessing if I -- if I told you which ones they were applied to.
 - Q Well, and they would have been applied not by the payor?
- 16 A I would be guessing, counselor.
 - Q Well, when you receive a payment, I would imagine it comes into your accounts payable department, and they apply it to amounts that are outstanding under contracts, correct?
- A Which ones is -- is depending on which invoices are paid against it, and I don't have a record of that or knowledge of it.
- Q Okay. No record and no knowledge, but payments have been made, we know that, correct?
 - A They've been made for the last four years, yes.

- Fabrizio Cross (Ros) 56 I didn't ask you about -- okay, for the last four years. 1 2 But payments have been made since the filing of the 3 bankruptcy case, have they not? They have been, yes. 4 5 Okay. And no amounts are due for post-petition, as you 6 sit there today? 7 They're due tomorrow, correct. Based on those two facts, the payments have -- that have 8 9 been made only could be on account of prepetition amounts, 10 isn't that correct? I -- I would be guessing if I answered that. 11 12 (Pause in proceedings.) MR. LANDIS: That's all I have for this witness. 13 14 MR. ROSEN: I just have a few questions, Your 15 Honor. THE COURT: Okay. 16 17 CROSS-EXAMINATION 18 BY MR. ROSEN: 19 Sir, how much was paid? 20 Approximately \$5 million. And the amount under the contract that is supposed to be 21 paid is \$5 million a month, is that correct? 22 It's not a set amount. It's a variable amount each 23
 - Counsel represented before it was approximately five

month depending on what services are delivered.

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million a month?

- A It's approximately five million.
- Q Okay. And -- and if you got a payment of \$5 million and you applied it to a prepetition amount that you might not have otherwise been permitted to do by the Bankruptcy Code, that would have been a prepayment then on a post-petition amount, is that correct?
- A I would be guessing if I answered that.
- Q Okay. Do you know if you're allowed to take money from a debtor's estate and apply it to a prepetition claim?
- A I do not know. That's out of my area of expertise.
- Q Okay. Mr. Landis talked to you for a little bit about filing of a claim, and before your counsel had launched into a lot of amounts that he thought you would be "out of pocket" for. Would you include the amount of undepreciated amounts in a proof of claim as your prospective proof of claim?
- 18 A Yes.
 - Q Would you include in the amounts any severance that you have paid to any employees in your prepetition claim?
 - A I don't understand the difference between prepetition, why that would --
 - Q Any -- any claims for rejection damages, would you include the so-called \$2.4 million in severance obligations in a proof of claim?

MR. LIPKE: Objection, Your Honor. Foundation. 1 Ι 2 think there -- he's asking legal conclusions as to what 3 would be put into a proof of claim, what would be damages 4 for a proof --5 THE COURT: Yes, isn't that a legal --MR. LIPKE: -- for a proof of claim. 6 7 THE COURT: -- isn't that a legal conclusion? 8 MR. ROSEN: Well, Your Honor, I actually don't 9 think it is. I mean, he has stated that he is going to be 10 -- or counsel -- and then through the proffer -- has stated that these amounts would be outstanding, and I'm just asking 11 if all --12 13 THE COURT: No, he's saying these are his damages. MR. ROSEN: -- his damages, and I'm asking if he 14 15 would include these damages in his proof of claim, that's all. 16 17 THE COURT: But is it relevant? 18 MR. ROSEN: Well, Your Honor, I'm just trying to 19 get to the point, and I think the same point that Mr. Landis 20 is making is, this is all just doing business. This is a 21 prepetition claim. 22 THE COURT: Well, that's -- that's argument. don't know that this is relevant to ask him whether he would 23 include it on a proof of claim form. 24

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BY MR. ROSEN:

- Q Mr. Fabrizio, have you ever been involved or -- in a contract that was rejected as part of a bankruptcy case?
- A No, sir.

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- Q Has Siemens ever had a contract rejected as part of a bankruptcy case?
- A I would be quessing. I have no idea.
- Q Okay. Have you been in court the entire afternoon since the calendar began?
 - A Yes, sir.
- Q And did you hear the statements made with respect to the preparation of schedules and the statements of financial affairs?
- 13 A As much as I can understand of it, yes.
 - Q And did you understand how long it was going to take the debtors to complete the process of those, the amount that they had been requested and the amount that the Court had granted as far as time to complete those schedules and statements?
- 19 A I would say basically.
 - Q And do you remember what that time frame was?
- 21 A Sometime in -- in December, I believe it was.
 - Q And you were asked before about the -- the integration of the computer system of Washington Mutual, and I believe it was your testimony -- is that you don't really know who's using what as long as they have a WaMu ID, is that correct?

- A That's correct.
 - Q And so would it surprise you that the debtors would need access to the computerized systems therefore to complete the schedules and the statement of financial affairs if, in fact, they were on the computer system and using the Siemens' software?
 - A Since the filing, we have not refused service to anyone and we don't intend to going forward.
- Q Well, I -- I appreciate that very much.
- 10 A Okay.

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- Q But would it surprise you if the debtors would need that in order to do what they have to do to complete the schedules and the statement of financial affairs?
- 14 A That wouldn't surprise me.
- Q Okay.
 - MR. ROSEN: That's all I have, Your Honor.
- 17 THE COURT: Okay. Any other party? All right.
- 18 Any redirect?
- 19 MR. LIPKE: No, Your Honor. Thank you.
- THE COURT: All right. Thank you. You may step down.
- 22 Any further testimony by the movant?
- 23 MR. LIPKE: No, Your Honor.
- THE COURT: All right. And does the debtor wish
- 25 to present any testimony?

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MR. ROSEN: No, Your Honor. I just wanted to respond. Counsel made some comments in opening statements and at the appropriate time, I would just like to respond to those.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I'll hear argument then. I've heard the opening by the movant. Let me hear from the objectors.

MR. ROSEN: Thank you, Your Honor.

Actually, Your Honor, our position is quite simple. These payments -- and as you heard the testimony, they have received \$5 million or approximately \$5 million. It is our view, Your Honor, that this is, based upon the bankruptcy law, something that would have had to have been applied on a post-petition basis. So not only is something not even due because it wouldn't be due until the earliest tomorrow, we believe, Your Honor, that JPMorgan Chase has already prepaid that month, and we're -- we're looking forward to the next month at this point in time.

We have worked very diligently here, Your Honor, to maintain a relationship --

THE COURT: Well, let -- let me question you on that. What day did you file bankruptcy?

MR. ROSEN: September 26th, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. The payment was due the last day of the month?

MR. ROSEN: According to the testimony, yes.

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THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. ROSEN: Your Honor, we've worked very hard since the outset of this case to work with JPMorgan Chase to mitigate any damages that might arise from any executory contract that might be out there. We have signed an agreement that's been written about in our pleadings that Mr. Fabrizio has seen whereby JPMorgan Chase is going to commit to make payments.

And, in fact, in this particular --

THE COURT: Am I ever going to see that agreement?

MR. ROSEN: The answer, Your Honor, is yes, we are preparing the motion to file with the Court.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ROSEN: JPMorgan has, in fact, gone forward and made payments. We heard that today, and we hope that they continue to do that so that, in fact, there are fewer rejection damage claims against the estate. We see no benefit here to the debtors' estates in allowing this relief to be provided.

I'm not sure what was actually being asked for. First, I thought it was a motion to compel the assumption or rejection. Then I thought, based upon the arguments presented by counsel that he was saying, I don't want you to follow the Bankruptcy Rules. I want a four-month runoff so

that I can mitigate my claim.

The Code provides, Your Honor, that we can reject any executory contract. The rules provide for notice and we can reject it and we can have an effective date as of that rejection. All that counsel's really asking for is to change the rules, change the contract to which they signed. And, Your Honor, we think that that is inappropriate. The debtors are going to do whatever the debtors have to do to reduce the claims for the benefit of all creditors.

And by allowing this -- as I said, I'm still not sure what the relief is based upon the argument here today, but by allowing the relief that's requested here, if, in fact, just taking it at face value, the Court establishes a date that is very short, we might be prejudiced, Your Honor, because we may not have -- we may not have the wherewithal to assume this, and we certainly wouldn't want to assume this generating 11 months worth of administrative expenses, or based upon counsel's representation, \$55 million worth of claims.

Your Honor, it would have to be rejected, and as a result, it would be an expeditious rejection, and we wouldn't have the benefit of going forward and completing the schedules and the statements of financial affairs. We see no harm to Siemens here. They're getting paid on an ongoing basis. That is the bottom line. That is what the

1 Courts look to.

If, in fact, there is no prejudice because they are getting paid, that is what should be the determinative factor, not looking four months out, based upon their transition services or what would be included in their proof of claim. That is not relevant at all, Your Honor. Solely relevant is, are they getting paid? Are they current? The answer is, they are.

THE COURT: Well, it's safe to say that you're not going to reject it until your schedules are completed, though. Is that safe to say?

MR. ROSEN: Your Honor, to the extent that we need to -- that little piece of software, and I say the little piece, because the bulk of this, Your Honor, services things that are not relevant at all to our estate. They are relevant to the entire Washington Bank system. And to the extent that the computers run and we need that data, you are correct.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LANDIS: Your Honor, I'm going to approach the podium this way around rather than do it from counsel table. Again for the record, Adam Landis from Landis, Rath and Cobb on behalf of JPMorgan Chase.

We -- we fundamentally agree with the debtors here. And what you've heard in testimony and in the

debtors' papers and you'll hear it from me as well, is that JPMorgan is committed to satisfying post-petition obligations under this Siemens' contract as and to the extent they benefit JPMorgan Chase and as they come due. We've heard in testimony that nothing is due post-petition today.

That doesn't go to the fact that you've also heard in testimony that amounts have been paid. Mr. Fabrizio testified that he didn't know how they were applied, he didn't know who paid them, and all of that can wait for later. But we can say assuredly today that amounts have already been paid regardless of the fact of their absolute requirement to be paid on a post-petition basis.

Your Honor, in terms of the balancing of the prejudice that's well known to this Court in terms of the legal standards here, you also heard testimony that this is a complex contract. You heard Mr. Fabrizio testify that there is no breaking out of the costs that would be allocable to WMI or to WMB. You've heard Mr. Fabrizio testify that there are negotiations ongoing between the parties, between the debtors, JPMorgan Chase and Siemens. Those negotiations need to continue.

And I would not ever seek to negotiate in front of the Court, but, frankly, Your Honor, were you to order the debtors to assume or reject on a shorter time table than

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what is allowed under the Bankruptcy Code, they will be prejudiced in any negotiations that go on, and they are ongoing, because these contracts, as you heard from Mr.

Rosen, the contract is -- is needed. It's required for the debtors in connection with what it needs to do in this case. And to the extent it's required for JPMorgan Chase and to the extent that the contract is not rejected, I reiterate, that JPMorgan Chase is going to pay on a post-petition basis as those amounts are presented to it.

THE COURT: Well, see my problem is, I don't know what the contract says, and listening to you, I'm not getting from you that you're going to pay the full amount.

MR. LANDIS: Well, Your Honor, let me -- let me be quite clear, and there is a stipulation, and Your Honor does need to see the stipulation --

THE COURT: Well --

MR. LANDIS: -- and it will be filed with the Court. And it will be subject to notice and be approved by parties. But we have agreed to pay --

THE COURT: Well, this motion's been pending since October 7th, so --

MR. LANDIS: Well, Your Honor, I know there's -- there's an awful lot that goes on outside --

THE COURT: I do, too.

MR. LANDIS: -- of the courtroom, and, you know,

part of that is getting things prepared in an appropriate 1 2 way so agreements are made. But JPMorgan Chase is prepared 3 to pay, and we have talked -- talked and discussed it with debtors, and the stipulation provides that we will pay for 4 5 the benefits that we receive under the contract. So to the 6 extent that the debtors --THE COURT: But something different from what the 7 8 -- I think, the debtors suggested in their papers? 9 MR. LANDIS: Well, Your Honor, to the extent that 10 there are amounts that are owing post-petition, Siemens will be paid. That is clear. And JPMorgan --11 12 THE COURT: How is that clear? By whom? MR. LANDIS: What's that? 13 THE COURT: How is it clear that Siemens is going 14 15 to be paid all post-petition amounts? MR. LANDIS: Your Honor, I believe that Siemens 16 17 knows that from having seen the stipulation, and I believe 18 that, you know, I've been very clear on the record that --19 that we're going to pay. 20 THE COURT: You're going to pay to the extent you 21 get the service -- you get services. 22 MR. LANDIS: And what -- and what --23 THE COURT: I mean, is this going to be parsed 24 out?

MR. LANDIS: -- what -- well --

THE COURT: To the extent you didn't get something, maybe you're not going to pay for it? To the extent it benefitted the debtor, not you, you're not going to pay for it?

MR. LANDIS: Well, Your Honor, I think that that's precisely the reason that more time is needed, because the contract is complex. And as I stand here today, and it was handed up to Your Honor, it's not entirely clear who's getting what. If JPMorgan is getting and is responsible for all the benefits because they cannot be broken out, JPMorgan is going to pay.

I mean, it's -- we are well familiar with the payto-play rule during the pendency of an assumption or rejection, and the debtors are familiar with that as well.

And what you have heard is that JPMorgan Chase will pay. So that I think eliminates the prejudice argument.

To get to one final point, Your Honor, all the testimony from Mr. Fabrizio in connection with the potential claims, those are all prepetition claims, those are damage claims. It would be wonderful if those claims could be mitigated, and the fact that the contract has a runoff period that would otherwise allow certain things to happen in bankruptcy in some respects is an unfortunate fact.

The debtors do have a right to assume or reject.

They're going to do so reasonably. They're going to do so

in a way that makes sense for the estate and working to 1 2 minimize claims, and JPMorgan is working with the debtors, 3 committed to working with the debtors, and we'll get something done, you know, as quickly as possible. So that's 4 5 all I have, Your Honor. 6 THE COURT: All right. Does movant wish to 7 respond? MR. LIPKE: If I may, Your Honor, very brief. 8 9 First, I start out with a clarification that I did 10 not state and the testimony is not that we asked for a four-11 month wind-down period. The testimony was that the contract 12 provides for a four-month wind-down period, and the reason 13 that it's in there to show the basis of a prejudice if we're given a seven-day motion notice for purposes of rejection. 14 THE COURT: Well, isn't that exactly what you're 15 16 asking for? You're asking me today to order them to assume 17 or reject this contract in ten days. 18 MR. LIPKE: Yes. 19 THE COURT: They're not going to assume it. 20 They're going to reject that contract. MR. LIPKE: That's what my conclusion in the reply 21 provides --22

THE COURT: So --

MR. LIPKE: -- I believe that. So, Your Honor --

THE COURT: -- you're asking for exactly what you

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say you don't want to happen.

MR. LIPKE: Well, Your Honor, then we'll know. Then we'll be able to tell the employees, if it's rejected in ten days, we'll be able to go out, we'll know exactly, you know, what -- what we have.

THE COURT: You won't be mitigating any of these damages you say you're going to suffer.

MR. LIPKE: We'll attempt to, we'll attempt to. But we're -- but we're willing to do that because then we'll know. Right now, Mr. Fabrizio testified that he has weekly calls with the employees. He's lost ten of them. And that he has to explain to them that he cannot tell them when they'll be retained, if they'll be retained, how long the contract will be in place. There was no rebuttal to the testimony.

THE COURT: Isn't that better than knowing that in ten days they're going to be fired, because that's the alternative?

MR. LIPKE: Your Honor, you're not being asked to give them time to assume the contract. You're being asked to give them time to reject it. And the only -- the only detriment to the -- to the debtor that I heard testimony on was that they might not have sufficient IT services to complete the schedules and statement of financial affairs.

And I can stand here before Your Honor today and

tell you that even if the contract is rejected as it relates to the bank, that JPMorgan is using the services, that they'll continue to provide the services to the debtor for purposes of completing the schedules and statement of financial affairs, which I believe has very little, if anything, to do with the bank, where the majority, if not essentially all of the services, are provided. It's the bank where these services are provided.

The only testimony before Your Honor is that the contract was intended to service all of the employees in the 2,500 locations which are the branches. And we don't believe it's fair to leave us in limbo in not knowing when this contract is going to terminate. The only testimony before Your Honor is that -- that they could make this decision in ten days based on his experience in this industry.

And all we're asking Your Honor to do is have them make the decision and then we'll deal with it. And the only real detriment to the debtor in having that done, if it is, is the schedules and statement of financial affairs, and I'll commit today, Your Honor, that we'll provide the debtor with whatever IT services are necessary to complete the -- the schedules and statement of financial affairs by December.

Your Honor, again, Your Honor can shorten the time

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on a balance of burdens, and you've heard --

THE COURT: Yes, but shortening the time isn't going to help you. It's going to give you exactly what you don't want me to give you.

MR. LIPKE: Your Honor, if we didn't want it, we wouldn't ask for it.

THE COURT: Well --

MR. LIPKE: I mean, I've been --

THE COURT: -- I think you wanted to compel the debtor to assume your contract, but the debtor's not going to assume your contract.

MR. LIPKE: We can't ask you to compel the debtors to assume the contract.

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. LIPKE: My conclusion in my reply suggests that it becomes clear that the debtor's not going to assume the contract and pay the ten million. And -- and, therefore, what Your Honor is being asked by them to do is wait until confirmation is what I've heard them say to allow them to reject the contract.

THE COURT: Well, the plan may not be confirmed before October of '09.

MR. LIPKE: That may be. But we don't know. if Your Honor says I'm going to give you 90 days to decide whether or not to assume or reject the contract, on seven-

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LIPKE: -- with Weil, Gotshal, but it -- the

days' notice, they can give us a notice and reject it, and we're -- we're standing there holding all of the damages that are set forth in there that prejudice us.

THE COURT: But isn't 90 days from now better than ten days from now?

MR. LIPKE: Not for us if we don't know what --

THE COURT: Why?

MR. LIPKE: -- not for us, Your Honor, if we don't know. We would rather get rid of the contract and move on and reemploy these people if we can and -- and move on. And that's why we're asking for this relief. And the only testimony before Your Honor is that they could make that decision in ten days. They've already had 30. We've met with them for 30 days on a daily basis. Your Honor has a copy of the contract. The contract -- it may be complex, but it's 68 pages long.

And they -- and they -- we've met with them for 30 days, and I've talked to counsel for at least the last several days. A week before we filed the motion, we emailed looking for discussions with counsel which we -- we didn't get. Understood, they're busy, a lot of balls in the air. As soon as we filed the motion, we got discussions going with JPMorgan counsel. Had one call --

point is, Your Honor, that they could figure out within the 1 2 last 30 days --3 THE COURT: They know what they're going to do. MR. LIPKE: They do. 4 5 THE COURT: They're going to reject the contract. The question is when they're going to reject the contract. 6 7 MR. LIPKE: And I'm asking you to -- to ask them 8 to do it in two weeks -- ten days. 9 THE COURT: How will that help, making them reject 10 it in two -- how will that help you versus them waiting till the end of the year after their schedules are performed --11 12 MR. LIPKE: I think -- I can go --13 THE COURT: -- are completed? MR. LIPKE: I'm sorry, I interrupted you, and I 14 15 apologize. I apologize. THE COURT: I mean -- well, why isn't getting two 16 17 more months out -- of payment out of them and giving your 18 employees 60 days' notice of termination better than ten 19 days? 20 MR. LIPKE: Then I can go back and I can advise them that this contract is likely to be rejected in ten 21 days, start doing your job. 22 23 THE COURT: Yes, but why is that better? 24 MR. LIPKE: It's better for us on a --25 THE COURT: The employees -- well, how is it

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MR. LIPKE: -- we just --

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THE COURT: After all that you've put in your

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papers and testimony?

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MR. LIPKE: We've decided on a business basis that

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it's better for us, because then we'll know and we're not

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left in limbo.

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THE COURT: Well, let me hear from the debtor.

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Anything further?

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MR. ROSEN: Your Honor, counsel stood up and said,

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you know, if you tell me in seven days that I -- that you're

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going to reject, I'm going to know, and my point is, I'll

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give you that notice seven days -- 60, 90, whatever days

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from now, you'll get that same notice. But you're going to

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get your \$5 million a month in the interim.

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Your Honor. He's getting paid currently, and the debtor

He hasn't met his burden under the applicable law,

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should have the opportunity to make the decision at the

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appropriate time as long as there is no prejudice to them.

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MR. HODARA: Thank you, Your Honor. Fred Hodara

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for the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors.

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arguments made by the debtor, and for that matter, by

Your Honor, the Committee fully supports the

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JPMorgan, and, in fact, we are pleased in many respects that

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this hearing has pulled out some of the statements and

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recognition by JPMorgan of its obligations.

I think that, as Mr. Rosen has said, with respect to the burden here on this motion under the Bankruptcy Code and the standard for the debtor having the right to deal with contracts of this sort, that a further reason why it's important to the estate and to the estate's creditors that the debtor get the normal allotment of time to consider what to do is that it may well be that in the course of working through this complex contract, that there are ways that the rejection damages claims can be ameliorated rather than a rejection occur, as Your Honor indicates, in ten days and damages flow from that rejection.

So we think for that reason as well, it's in the interest of the estate to allow this to take its normal course under the Bankruptcy Code and -- and permits the parties what is best to do with this contract.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. LANDIS: I have --

THE COURT: I know you have a reply.

MR. LANDIS: One point to add -- it may not be the point Your Honor thinks I'm going to add.

There were statements with respect to what JPMorgan told Mr. Fabrizio or others in connection with how long it would take them. You heard 90 days. You heard

maybe ten days. You heard other things. All that, Your Honor, I believe is hearsay. We don't have real testimony on what it will take to make a decision for JPMorgan Chase. We have Mr. Fabrizio saying what he thinks JPMorgan should be able to do to make the decision in what period of time, and so I wanted -- I want to highlight that one fact.

And I also want to say that yes, JPMorgan has said a number of times in a number of ways and we'll stand by it, that we will pay our obligations pursuant to the stipulation which will be filed with the Court and approved, we hope, and we already have made payments and continue to do so.

THE COURT: Well, let me rule on the motion. I'm compelled to deny the motion. The Bankruptcy Code does give the debtor until confirmation time to decide whether to assume or reject an executory contract.

In the interim, the debtor's compelled to make the post-petition payments that are required. Although I haven't seen it, I'm advised that the debtor and JPMorgan have a stipulation by which JPMorgan has committed to pay under that contract to the extent it is receiving the services under that contract.

Siemens' -- Siemens' motion asks me to require the debtor to decide in ten days whether to assume or reject the contract, but it's clear based on the alleged prejudice that Siemens has articulated, that is, its severance payments for

employees, its prepayment penalties for its vendors, the fact that it has not fully depreciated the costs or expenses of this contract because approximately another year remains on the contract, all of those types of damages are damages that would be alleviated only if the debtor were to assume the contract.

It is clear the debtor will not be assuming this contract because, as Siemens has established, most of the services, it appears, under the contract are being provided to the Washington Mutual Bank or non-debtor subsidiaries. The debtor has stated that it will not be assuming this contract.

Since I cannot compel the debtor to assume the contract, as Siemens acknowledges, it's clear that the only alternative I would have would be to compel the debtor to decide to reject the contract early. That will not alleviate any of the rejection damages that Siemens says it seeks to eliminate.

In fact, by allowing the debtor further time to determine whether and when to reject the contract, Siemens will, in fact, be -- continue to get paid the post-petition price and that will reduce its rejection damages. So I believe that it is in everybody's best interest not to require the debtor to determine early whether to reject that contract and when to reject it. So I'll deny the motion at

1 this time.

With respect to the adequate assurance of timely payment, it appears that payments are being made, and I don't think that any relief is required on that at this point. Obviously, to the extent payments are not received, a new motion can be filed.

MR. ROSEN: Your Honor, would you like us to prepare a short order just with respect to the denial or --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ROSEN: Thank you.

THE COURT: That's fine.

MR. ROSEN: Your Honor, I think that concludes this afternoon's calendar.

THE COURT: All right. Just for the record, the other motions that were on the agenda are continued.

MR. ROSEN: Yes. I'm sorry, I think -- I thought the agenda reflected to November 14th.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ROSEN: Thank you very much. Your Honor, we do have that order on the interim compensation for --

THE COURT: All right. Do you want to hand that up? Thank you. And I'll enter that.

All right. We'll stand adjourned.

(Proceedings concluded at 3:47 p.m.)

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1	CERTIFICATION
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4	I, Lois A. Vitarelli, court approved transcriber,
5	certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the
6	official electronic sound recording of the proceedings in
7	the above-entitled matter.
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11	November 7, 2008
12	LOIS A. VITARELLI
13	DIANA DOMAN TRANSCRIBING
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